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Is Sovereignty Dead? 
The Transformation of International Politics*
RUXANDRA IVAN
Understood in its most widely accepted sense in the legal doctrine, as exclusivity 
of jurisdiction and non-intervention in another state’s internal affairs1, sovereignty 
is challenged nowadays both from domestic politics and the international – and, 
what is more, even this distinction between domestic and international has 
become blurred. The purpose of this article is to document the way in which the 
transformation or the emergence of different institutions, practices and discourses 
lead to the transformation of the content of the notion of ”sovereignty”, as well as 
the consequences of this process for international politics. We will thus develop an 
argument about the challenges to which state sovereignty is subjected, as well as 
about the reaction to those challenges. This argument will unfold into four steps. 
We will show the way in which the emergence of certain international institutions, 
such as international jurisdictions and the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, 
is challenging sovereignty in both its internal and external dimensions. Then, we 
will argue that the phenomenon of globalization actually undermines the ontological 
foundations of sovereignty: the territorial nature of the modern state, and the 
cohesiveness of its body politic. Finally, the counterweight to these processes, which 
is an attempt to re-institute sovereignty through a tighter control of the state over 
society, will be discussed. We will conclude with a reflection upon the consequences 
of this process, which fundamentally affect the very relation between the individual, 
the state and the international system. 
International Jurisdiction
The exclusivity of jurisdiction of the state over its citizens is undermined by 
the emergence of two different types of international courts. The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) can judge complaints by individuals against the state. The 
International Criminal Court (ICC) can judge, in the name of a universal jurisdiction, 
certain categories of crimes against mankind. Both courts are acting on the basis of a 
body of law which is not part of, neither hierarchically linked to, international law: 
human rights.
* Acknowledgment: This paper was made within ”The Knowledge Based Society Project – 
Researches, Debates, Perspectives”, supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human 
Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the 
Romanian Government under the contract number POSDRU ID 56815.
1 Ian BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edition, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford and New York, 1998, p. 268. See also Kalevi J. HOLSTI, Taming the Sovereigns. Institutional 
Change in International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2004, 
pp. 112-142, for a similar definition.
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Paul Magnette draws the attention that the ECHR is an ”unprecedented 
protection mechanism”, however based on a ”relatively little original”1 text which is 
the European Convention on Human Rights, signed in 1949. The acceptance, by the 
signatory States, to submit to the jurisdiction of the ECHR is, historically, the first 
voluntary limitation of their right to exclusive jurisdiction. The Court can be referred 
to by states, individuals, non-governmental organizations or groups of individuals2. It 
is true that the ECHR steps in only after the exhaustion of all domestic remedies3, but 
this only reinforces the challenge it puts to the content of sovereignty as traditionally 
understood. The Court can rule against the State Parties and its final decision is 
binding. This is why we are witnessing 
”a fundamental institutional innovation. The principle of this device consists in 
the recognition by the state of some binding limits to their internal sovereignty, 
by placing these fundamental rights above their legislative powers. Its form 
consists in the assignment, to a superior court, of the task of ensuring compliance 
with these rights, which can be interpreted as a self-limitation of their external 
sovereignty...”4.
The gesture of placing a body of law above the legislative powers of the sovereign 
is, on the one hand, a confirmation of sovereignty as the right to decide exception, 
but on the other hand, it fundamentally undermines sovereignty in its dimension of 
never submitting to a higher authority.
The case of the ICC is different in its technical aspects from that of the ECHR, 
but it is linked to the same process of erosion of the exclusivity of jurisdiction. The 
ICC does not condemn states in order to protect individual rights, but condemns 
individuals for criminal offenses in the name of universal human rights. 
The ICC was established through the Rome Statute, signed in 1998 and entered into 
force in July 2002. At the moment, there are 121 States Parties to the Rome Statute, out of 
the 193 UN member States. But several important ”pillars” of the international system 
are missing from this list, such as the USA, the Russian Federation, or China – all of them 
permanent members of the UN Security Council and thus having a veto right. 
The Court can judge four types of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and the crime of aggression (Rome Statute, art. 5). The Statute is more 
ambiguous in what concerns whom it is competent to judge. Article 12 explicitly states 
that two cases can be taken into account: the Court can judge either nationals of the 
Sates Parties, or nationals of third states who committed crimes on the territory of 
States Parties. This means an explicit renouncement by states to their exclusivity of 
jurisdiction, defined both territorially and in terms of citizenship. But the ambiguity 
of this provision comes from elsewhere. Let’s take the following fictive example: 
if a Chinese citizen commits crimes against humanity on the Cambodian territory 
(which is a Party to the ICC), it can be deferred to the Court. Moreover, the third 
paragraph of article 12 indefinitely extends the area of jurisdiction of the Court, by 
1 Paul MAGNETTE, Europa, Statul şi democraţia. Suveranul îmblânzit, Romanian transl. by 
Ruxandra Ivan, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2005, p. 47. 
2 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 33, 34. 
3 Ibidem, art. 35.1.
4 Paul MAGNETTE, Europa, Statul şi democraţia...cit., p. 48. 
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allowing a state which is not a Party to the Statute to accept the jurisdiction of the 
Court for a particular case. For example, if an American citizen commits one of the 
four incriminated acts on the territory of Russia, the latter can accept the jurisdiction 
of the Court for the case in point. This virtually makes possible even for the countries 
that have not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court to be, to some extent, subject of 
the Rome Treaty. The state as such is not concerned, as subject of international law; 
but the situation described above implies that virtually all non-signatory states lose 
exclusive jurisdiction over their nationals, without having accepted this1. Sovereignty 
is thus limited even for those states that did not accept the Rome Statute. This is why 
the USA has been signing, since 2002, bilateral treaties with as many countries as 
possible in order to make sure that its nationals would not be deferred to the Court 
in any case2. This appears to be the only legal possibility for a state to exempt its 
citizens from ICC jurisdiction and therefore preserve its sovereignty untouched. 
However, signing such bilateral treaties is a profoundly political issue, because the 
USA has more means to ”convince” its partners to do so than have other states. It can 
be hardly imaginable that many countries would sign non-extradition treaties with 
Afghanistan, for example. This is how international law now offers a framework in 
which some states can be ”more sovereign” than others3. 
A situation can be referred to the Court by a State Party (art. 14), by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter (art. 13b), or by the initiative of 
the Prosecutor of the Court (art. 15). The latter case significantly extends the area of 
competence of the Court, since bringing a criminal before justice does not depend 
anymore on the authority of any state, or group of states. The Court thus gains an 
important autonomy with respect to those who created it – the states – and escapes 
their control. This is one of the evolutions against which some of the states which took 
part in the negotiations of the Rome Statute drew the attention of the international 
community. But others considered it to be desirable from the point of view of the 
independence of the Court. 
The Rome Statute is the result of hard negotiations between the signatory states. 
Even non-signatories, such as the USA, have participated in negotiations (and have 
only decided later that they would not ratify). This is why sometimes the terms of the 
Treaty are softer than one would have been expected from a universal jurisdiction. 
1 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 34-38, poses the principle that 
only states that are Parties to a Treaty should be bound by its terms. This is one of the main 
principles of international law. 
2 A list of the States that signed such a Treaty can be found at http://www.amicc.org/
usinfo/administration_policy_BIAs.html#countries (accessed on 22 April 2007): there are 95 
states that signed bilateral agreements with the USA which are into force, out of which 49 are 
State Parties to the Rome Statute. The complete texts of the agreements are also available at the 
same URL. 
3 The idea of ”more” and ”less sovereign” states has also been developed by Jacques 
DERRIDA, ”The Reason of the Strongest (Are There Rogue States?)”, in IDEM, Rogue. Two 
Essays on Reason, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2005, passim, with other examples. 
However, this point of view differs from that of Holsti, according to which ”Sovereignty is 
a distinct legal or juridical status. A state is either sovereign or it is not. It cannot be partly 
sovereign or have ’eroded’ sovereignty no matter how weak or ineffective it may be” (Kalevi J. 
HOLSTI, Taming the Sovereigns...cit., p. 114). Indeed, in legal terms, being sovereign is a black-
or-white status; in the meantime, as Derrida would say, in ”ontotheological” terms, a subject 
can be more or less sovereign (Jacques DERRIDA, Rogue…cit., p. XIII).
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But nevertheless, the Treaty creates limits for state sovereignty, both for States Parties 
and non-Parties, in several ways. For the States Parties, the Treaty creates an area 
in which they loose jurisdiction over their nationals and over their territory (while 
exclusive jurisdiction is one of the main features of sovereignty). Moreover, in a way, 
the individual becomes directly linked to the international level, trespassing the 
national one, which renders obsolete the assumption that there is no higher authority 
than the state and thus undermining the external dimension of sovereignty. 
The situation is even worse for states which are not parties to the Treaty, as they 
may loose jurisdiction over their nationals without having accepted it. In the words 
of David Scheffer: 
”Article 12 of the ICC treaty reduces the need for ratification of the treaty 
by national governments by providing the Court with a jurisdiction over the 
nationals of a non-party State. Under article 12, the ICC may exercise such 
jurisdiction over anyone anywhere in the world, even in the absence of referral 
by the Security Council...”1. 
The two types of international jurisdiction discussed above pose a double 
problem. The first concerns the linkage between international law, domestic law and 
human rights law. The second concerns the individual as subject of an international 
jurisdiction. Two types of questions are salient with respect to this double problem: 
first, how is it possible to link, in the legal doctrine but also from a philosophical point 
of view, international law and human rights law in the same legal order?; second, 
what is the meaning of this evolution? Whom does it serve, how did it take place and 
with what consequences on the evolution of the international environment? 
The technical peculiarities of the ICC cover a wide range of aspects. It directly 
judges the perpetrators – that is, individuals, being a jurisdiction which is established 
in the name of a universal competence – and not a inter-governmental one. Although 
the ICC is established by a Treaty signed by states, the body of law which it applies is 
not international law, but human rights and criminal law; it also acts in the name of 
a ”universal” jurisdiction. Thus, the inter-national, the universal/transnational and 
the domestic dimensions are intertwined in this relatively new and hybrid form of 
international jurisdiction. However, bringing a body of domestic law (in this case, 
criminal law) onto the international level constitutes an awkward evolution2. 
There are other, more philosophical questions related to the jurisdiction of the 
ICC, such as the problem of the articulation between the fundamental norm of the 
international system – that is, sovereignty – and the fundamental norm of human 
rights – that is, the right to life. More generally speaking, this is a problem of linkage, 
or hierarchy, between two bodies of law: international law and human rights law. 
1 David T. SCHEFFER, ”The US and the International Criminal Court”, The American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 93, no. 1, January 1999, pp. 12-22/p. 18. 
2 This evolution might also be interpreted as a hypostasis of the process of ”constitutio-
nalization of international law”, a process that has been documented, among others, by Jan 
KLABBERS, Ann PETERS, Geir ULFSTEIN, The Constitutionalization of International Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford and New York, 2009; Erika DE WET, ”The International Constitutional 
Order”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 55, no. 1, 2006, pp. 51-76; Jeffrey L. 
DUNOFF, Joel P. TRACHTMAN (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, 
and Global Governance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.
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Which is the relation between human rights law and international law? That is, if 
we accept, following Kelsen1, that any legal system has a hierarchy of norms, what 
hierarchical relation can be established between these two bodies of law? 
Traditionally, international law – jus gentium – is a body of law whose subjects 
are the states. States sign treaties, conventions and agree to be bound by norms in 
a society which is structurally anarchical, with no authority capable of enhancing 
the law. Individuals are not – or were not, until recently, considered subjects of 
international law. The Nuremberg trials have introduced a breach in this logic, by 
allowing individuals to be tried by a jurisdiction other than the national one. A blank 
period followed during the Cold War, when the bipolar structure of the system did 
not allow for the emergence of a consensus over the issue of an international human 
rights jurisdiction. But the establishment, in 1993, of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, and then, in 1994, of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda opened the way for the development that culminated, in 1998, with the 
signing of the Rome statutes.
The theoretical justification of the possibility of existence of an international 
human rights jurisdiction is not yet very clear – although it is quite widely accepted 
nowadays. It nevertheless raises several questions – to which we don’t pretend to 
have an answer, but which are important to be aware of. First, the relation between 
the body of international law and that of human rights remains blurred. A hierarchy 
between these two bodies of law cannot be convincingly argued, since they differ 
in nature, scope, and form. From this point of view, an international human rights 
juris diction cannot be quite inter-national, because its subjects are not states, but 
individuals. (A more accurate word would probably be universal criminal justice, 
but the claim to universality is, itself, contestable.) Thus, second, another issue to be 
clarified is the statute of the individual as subject of international justice – and hence 
of international law. The implications of this evolution are quite troubling for the 
future of world politics. The erosion of the state as an international actor has already 
been emphasized by research in international political economy (as linked to the 
incapacity to control markets)2 or migration and borders (as linked to the porousness 
of borders)3, but the penetration of the individual into the international might be a 
sign of the constitutionalization of international law, in legal terms, and of the world 
becoming a single polity, in political terms. The state level is more and more affected 
and is becoming less and less relevant. Third, and directly related to our previous 
comment, we should again ask the question of the transformation of the meaning 
of sovereignty. It is now possible for citizens of a European state to appeal to a Court 
1 Hans KELSEN, Pure Theory of Law, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. 
International lawyers might argue that one cannot invoke Kelsen on this matter because his 
theory of the hierarchy of norms is valid only in constitutional legal orders. To this objection, we can 
respond that, in fact, putting together human rights and international law (through the creation 
of the ICC, for example) is precisely a hypostasis of what has been called constitutionnalization 
of international law (see, for ex., Erika DE WET, ”The International Constitutional Order”, cit.; 
Antonio SEGURA SERRANO, ”The Transformation of International Law”, Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 12/09, 2009). 
2 Susan STRANGE, The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. 
3 John RUGGIE, ”Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations”, International Organization, vol. 47, no. 1, 1993, pp. 139-174. 
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when they consider themselves injured by the State, and that this Court takes a stand 
against the state; it is now possible for a Court to prosecute individuals even though 
the state whose nationals they are does not agree: aren’t these obvious examples of a 
certain erosion of sovereignty, as traditionally accepted? 
The issue of the individual becoming a subject of international law has numerous 
implications. It is linked, as mentioned above, to the declining role of the state as 
an international actor in the globalizing world. As frontiers become more and more 
permeable, and thus more and more irrelevant, the founding distinction laying at the 
bases of the identity of the state – the distinction inside/outside – becomes blurred1. 
This allows for the diffusion of power – initially residing inside the state – towards 
the outside – but the problem is that, outside, there is no single entity capable of 
assuming the functions of the state. International criminal justice takes over an object 
– populations, that have to be protected – and a subject, the perpetrator, by precisely 
leaving aside the state, and by performing a particular technique of power. What has 
been, until now, ”international politics” is becoming, in the words of G. Agamben, 
”politics contaminated with law”2.
How can we explain that the international criminal jurisdiction only covers one 
of the natural rights presented in the doctrine throughout the centuries? Why is the 
right to life considered superior to all others, and why is life more universal than 
liberty? We think that one possible answer to this question is biopolitics. In the light 
of this hypothesis, we might further push Agamben’s expression and say that the 
developing regime of international criminal justice can be considered law contaminated 
with bare life. Because all other attributes, except the fact of being alive, have been 
taken away from the victims of the crimes punished by international criminal justice. 
The victim is not perceived as an individual or citizen endowed with rights – be they 
natural or positive: the only feature that seems to characterize these ”populations”, 
as they are most frequently called, is their bare life. Actually, it is biological life that is 
protected by international criminal justice, and not necessarily human rights – which 
include quite more than the right to life. Or, this preoccupation for biological life 
might not be anything more than a technical requirement of governance intended to 
produce a stable environment. 
Thus, coming back to our earlier discussion, in legal terms, the result of the 
articu lation between international law and human rights law is precisely what we call 
international criminal law. But, on the other hand, in political, or rather bio-political 
terms, the result of this articulation is a transfer of the paradigm of governmentality3 
from the national, state-level, to the international level (or we should rather call it 
”universal” level, because it is based more on the affirmation of some general moral 
values, that on inter-governmental practices). 
Michel Foucault has made an argument about the way in which, historically, the State 
has begun, since the end of the 17th century, to treat its subjects – the citizens – in terms 
of ”populations” while the power is more and more exercised as a power over the bare 
1 R.B.J. WALKER, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1993. 
2 Giorgio AGAMBEN, Homo sacer. Puterea suverană şi viaţa nudă (I), transl. from Italian by 
Alexandru Cistelecan, Idea Design and Print, Cluj-Napoca, 2006. 
3 The physical limitations of an article do not allow us to develop on this notion; but we 
understand ”governmentality” in the sense given by Michel FOUCAULT in Securitate, teritoriu, 
populaţie, Romanian transl. by Bogdan Ghiu, Cluj-Napoca, Idea Design & Print, 2009. 
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life. Series, statistics and probabilities are some of the means by which the state manages 
the population, with the purpose of ensuring its ”security”. Thus the space where the 
state exercises its power becomes a space populated by masses, and not by individuals. 
The political concept of ”citizens” is replaced by the statistical idea of ”population”. The 
new technology of power – bio-power – is taking in charge the population, as a whole, 
as a totality. Biopolitics is, thus, politics that is ordered, structured, organized by the 
principle of security – not security of individuals, but of populations1. 
Or, the cases taken into account by international criminal justice – genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity – are precisely the types of offense that 
are threatening the security of populations in their biological dimension. We are thus 
witnessing a process of shifting of the bio-power paradigm from the national to the 
international – or should we say, universal? – level. Gradually, the international 
politics is no longer politics among states (or, as Morgenthau put it, among nations2), 
but politics of managing populations. The state is left aside, overlooked, excluded 
from this paradigm of exercising power. 
But, while in the domestic realm, the mechanisms of bio-power lay within 
the state, for the international level it is not at all clear which is the instance that 
exercises this bio-power. When a state fails to protect its subjects, or to do justice to 
the populations affected by mass murders, and cannot claim sovereignty anymore, it 
is a fictitious ”international community” who should take over the moral duty, the 
responsibility to protect. But is this a moral duty, or is it merely a technical requirement 
of disciplining the international political space? The international repercussions of 
genocide-type events are sometimes very important – waves of refugees, regional 
instability, economic problems. The Rwandan genocide, for example, spilled over 
the entire region. The interest of the so-called ”international community” is, first and 
foremost, maintaining stability and order.
International Intervention As ”Responsibility”
The reflections developed above apply not only to international criminal justice, 
but also to another emerging institution of world politics. The idea that fundamental 
human rights (and most of all, the right to life) should be protected at any price 
evolved not only in the direction of justice post factum, described in the previous 
section, but also in the direction of the prevention of human rights catastrophes. This 
is one of the rationales of the development, in the 2000s, of the notion of responsibility 
to protect (R2P). Again, the responsibility to protect addresses only the right to life – 
and, moreover, it does not concern individual lives, but lives of populations. 
The term ”R2P” made its appearance in the international political and legal 
language at the turn of the millennium, as the result of a semantic evolution which 
begun with the notion of ”humanitarian intervention”. But the word ”intervention” 
was – and still is – too powerful for states to accept it as a legal norm. During 
the academic and political debates around this issue in the 90s, the concept of 
1 Ibidem. See also IDEM, Trebuie să apărăm societatea, Romanian transl. by Bogdan Ghiu, Idea 
Design and Print, Cluj-Napoca, 2009, pp. 189-205. 
2 Hans MORGENTHAU, Politics Among Nations, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1948. 
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”humanitarian intervention” has evolved into ‘human security1, and finally reached 
its present form of ”R2P”2. This evolution is the result of the efforts that have been 
made to reconcile the idea of sovereignty with the idea of intervention, and it was 
possible thanks to an interpretation of sovereignty in which it does not only confer 
rights to its holders – the states – but also bestows obligations upon them, and above 
all, the obligation to protect their citizens. 
In September 2000, the Canadian Government created a commission for reflection 
upon the possibility of international intervention in cases of massive violations of 
human rights. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) worked for twelve month and published its report under the title Responsibility 
to Protect3. This is the first occurrence of this concept intended as a possible legal basis 
for an international intervention in order to prevent massive violations of human 
rights in the states that lack the capacity or the will to fulfill their duty of protection. 
A second step of the reflection upon the issue is the report of the High-Level Panel on 
threats, challenges and change, in the framework of the broader debate about the UN 
reform: A More Secure World. Our Shared Responsibility4. Unlike the ICISS Report, this 
report has been endorsed by the General Assembly of the UN5, and one of the reasons 
might be precisely that it treats the subject in a more ambiguous manner, not using 
the word ”intervention”. In 2005, in the outcome document of the World Summit, 
the issue was positively approached by the UN in the 139th paragraph of the World 
Summit Outcome Document (A/60/L1).
The most important steps forward in what concerns the legitimation of the 
international reaction have been made after 2008. One of them is the Report of the 
UN Secretary General Implementing the responsibility to protect and its endorsement by 
the UN General Assembly6. The latest important development is UN SC Resolution 
no. 1973/17.03.2011 concerning the situation in Libya. It ”reiterates the responsibility 
of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population” and imperatively asks for 
the end of the violence and abuses against the civilians. It also authorizes member 
states, after notification of the Secretary General and acting either ”nationally or 
through regional organizations or arrangements” to ”take all the necessary measures” 
to protect civilians7. It is the first time when the Security Council takes position on an 
internal issue of one of the UN member states by allowing intervention without the 
consent of the concerned state, and it is also the legal basis for the NATO intervention 
in Libya. This document is even more salient given that the Security Council was 
always reluctant to getting involved in the discussion about the responsibility to 
protect, precisely because it is such a politically sensitive issue. 
1 A.A., V.V., Francophonie et relations internationales, Éditions des Archives Contemporaines, 
Paris, 2009. 
2 We have explained in depth this transformation in Ruxandra IVAN, ”Deconstructing 
Security”, PolSci. Romanian Journal of Political Science, vol. XI, no. 2, 2011, pp. 105-128. 
3 The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Responsibility, International Development Research Center, Ottawa, 2001. 
4 A More Secure World. Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, New York, UN, 2004, http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf , 
retrieved on 20 February 2012. 
5 UN General Assembly A/59/565. 
6 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Report of the Secretary General, 12 January 2009, 
A/63/677.
7 UN Security Council Resolution no. 1973, 17 March 2011, S/RES/1973 (2011), par. 4. 
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The most controversial issues in the debate on the responsibility to protect 
concern the legitimacy of interventions (on what legal basis?), the actors (who should 
react? who should intervene on the field?), and the criteria required to launch an 
intervention. We will briefly address these issues after elucidating the meaning of the 
notion. 
The ”R2P” was invented in order to avoid terms such as ”intervention”. It was 
intended to promote the idea that sovereignty not only entails rights of the state, 
but also obligations; the most important, the obligation to protect the citizens. But 
to protect them from what? Long debates around this issue led to the inclusion, 
in the official documents, of four situations that engage the obligation to protect: 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The doctrine of 
the R2P foresees three main pillars of the notion: first of all, it is the state itself who 
is responsible to protect its citizens; if the state is not able to do it, it may appeal to 
the international community; and finally, if it is neither able, nor willing to do it, the 
responsibility is moved to the international community1. The international reaction is 
thus the ultimate resort both from a legal and a political point of view: legally, it is a 
suspension of the norm of sovereignty in favor of the principle of intervention; while 
politically, it is an answer to a situation in which the state loses its main function, 
which is, in Weberian terms, the monopoly over legitimate violence2. 
The emergence of the concept of ”R2P” in international law is linked to the more 
and more visible process through which the individual (or rather the ”population”) 
becomes a subject of international regulation. Assessing the evolutions of the 
international criminal justice, as well as of the doctrine of the R2P, one can observe a 
slow, but certain evolution towards an articulation between the body of international 
public law and the body of human rights law, in which the latter is superior to the 
former, in principle. The problems arise when it comes to the question of the degree, 
or threshold, of human rights abuses that is to be considered unacceptable and that 
requires the trespassing of the sovereignty norm. Another theoretical difficulty arises 
if we try to clarify who is the subject of the duty to protect: undoubtedly, the holder 
of sovereignty is the state, but who is, ultimately, the holder of the duty to intervene 
when the state is not willing or able to do so? Of course, one might say that it is 
”international community”, but this statement in no way diminishes the ambiguity 
of the problem: who is, ultimately, the international community? For the cases when 
the state cannot or does not want to assume this responsibility, who is responsible 
to react? This question can be reformulated as follows: who is the most appropriate 
representative of the international community? Here, the legal arguments cannot 
(and should not) obscure political considerations, because there are several actors 
and institutions that could assume this role and which are in competition with 
one another. The UN Charter is clear enough in what concerns the repartition of 
competences between the Security Council and the General Assembly; but the fact 
that the notion of ”R2P” is absent from the Charter allows for both institutions to 
reclaim competence, in a logic of institutional competition which exists at the UN. 
1 UN General Assembly, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary 
General, A/63/677, 12 January 2009, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/4989924d2.html, retrieved on 20 February 2012, § 54.
2 A state that commits human rights abuses can be categorized as a ”rogue State”. But 
precisely this labeling is a profoundly political issue. See Jacques DERRIDA, Rogue…cit.
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This competition, added to the lack of consensus among UN member states, allows 
for other, regional organizations to step in. In the absence of a clear reaction from the 
UN, these organizations can claim the role of ”representatives” of the international 
community and its values: it was the case of NATO in Kosovo in 1999, when its 
intervention was carried on without previous mandate from the UN, in the name 
of an international responsibility to stop ethnic cleansing. The question of the actors 
who should be in charge of the responsibility to react when the state fails is thus 
very politically significant. Knowing that political decisions are rarely motivated by 
moral considerations, the yet unsolved problem of the actors which should assume 
the responsibility to protect is becoming even more relevant from the point of view of 
the legitimacy of the reaction. 
The responsibility to react of the international community is engaged if the state is 
”manifestly” incapable of assuming its own responsibility, or if it is itself the perpetrator 
of the four above-mentioned crimes. From this point of view, the responsibility of the 
international community is only complementary to the responsibility of the state. This 
raises a problem about the precise moment when the international reaction should 
be engaged: which is the point from which it becomes ”manifest” that the state will 
not assume its responsibility to protect? A subsequent difficulty arises when the 
international community decides to act in the absence of a specific request from the 
concerned state, because the latter can argue that the international responsibility has 
been engaged too soon. On the other hand, waiting for the incapacity of reaction 
of the state to become ”manifest” can significantly delay the international reaction, 
in a situation where every minute is essential for saving lives. This difficulties have 
become apparent in practice in the Darfour crisis1.
Another problem is related to the qualification of a situation as being a ”genocide”, 
”war crime”, ”crime against humanity” or ”ethnic cleansing”. Defining a situation 
as pertaining to one of these categories is not a simple intellectual operation: it is a 
profoundly political gesture. Certain states can qualify an event as being a ”genocide”, 
while other can refuse to do so. None of these problems is directly addressed in the legal 
documents that refer to the responsibility to protect, which leads to decisions taken 
on a case-by-case basis, as was the case of the intervention in Libya. Consequently, 
there is no legal obligation to react of the international community, because the defining 
criteria for a situation that justifies a reaction are not very clear. 
The concept of R2P has been criticized for two different types of reasons: on the one 
hand, its content; on the other hand, the ineffectiveness of the international community 
in managing situations that fall under this title. There is no actual consensus, among 
international lawyers or among decision-makers, on the content of the responsibility 
to protect. The concept is vague and insufficiently defined. It is not yet an international 
norm in the real sense of the term. When it comes to its implementation, the criteria for 
an international reaction are very relative and leave room for different interpretations. 
This is why the ”responsibility to protect” can conceal great power interventionism. 
When the economic or strategic interests of the great powers are not a stake, there 
is not an authentic political will of the international community to react to massive 
human rights violations. In these conditions, there is a real possibility that groups of 
1 Alex J. BELLAMY, ”Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and 
Huma nitarian Intervention After Iraq”, Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 19, no. 2, 2005, 
pp. 31-54. 
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international mercenaries could be hired by certain interest groups in order to provoke 
conflicts that would request an international intervention under the ”responsibility to 
protect”1. And, last but not least, the competence of the decision-making is disputed 
between the General Assembly and the Security Council. For all these reasons, the 
notion has a long way to becoming an enforceable legal norm, but it has all the chances 
to be rhetorically used in order to legitimize foreign intervention. 
Furthermore, there are important differences in the way the legal texts approach 
the subject, which lead to differences in understanding the content of the notion 
(the ICISS Report, the High-Level Panel Report, the Outcome Document of the 2005 
Millennium Summit and the Report of the Secretary General)2. If there is indeed an 
agreement among states, the UN and the international civil society on accepting the 
fact that sovereignty entails responsibility, differences of approach come up as soon 
as the notion of ”responsibility to protect” appears in the public discourse. This leads, 
on one hand, to its legal ambiguity, but also, on the other hand, to its wide acceptance 
as a principle, because everyone gives it the most suited meaning from their own 
perspective3.
Other theorists emphasize the fact that the most important flaw of the ”respon-
sibility to react” is not necessarily its lack of legal basis, but on the contrary, the lack of 
political will. In the absence of political will, the utility of the concept is only marginal 
in international affairs4. The international reaction, in the name of humanitarian 
rationales, is undermined by two important dangers which put its legitimacy in 
question: the relativity of the criteria for reaction and the subjectivity of those who 
intervene5. 
As the Libyan case has shown, the insufficient development of the legal doctrine 
of the responsibility to protect, as well as its unsatisfactory codification in international 
law, creates an ambiguity which is used by the Security Council to decide on a case by 
case basis. Moreover, the field implementation of the Council’s decisions is itself very 
little detailed in the Resolutions – leaving much room for those who act on the spot. 
Taking these decisions on a case by case basis makes them more flexible for ground 
action, but the logic of a uniform application of law is undermined: the law loses its 
objective and universal character. Thus, the responsibility to protect is thrown back to 
politics and to a logic of interest and power.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, new ways to make the state more responsible 
– and ultimately more accountable – are sought for. International criminal justice is 
one aspect of this process which has as a result the declining of state sovereignty; 
the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is another. In the first case, the state is 
overlooked in its capacity to do justice to the victims and punish the perpetrators. 
In the second case, the state is patronized by the international community, which 
takes in charge the protection of populations if the state is not able, or not willing, to 
1 Alan J. KUPERMAN, ”Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect”, The Whitehead Journal of 
Diplomacy and International Relations, Winter-Spring 2009, pp. 19-29.
2 Carsten STAHN, ”Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?”, 
The American Journal of International Law, vol. 101, no. 1, Jan. 2007, pp. 99-120. 
3 Ibidem, p. 118. 
4 Jean-Marie CROUZATIER, ”Le principe de la responsabilité de protéger: avancée de 
la solidarité internationale ou ultime avatar de l’impérialisme?”, Aspects – Dossier thématique 
”Responsabilité de protéger”, no. 2, 2008, pp. 13-32. 
5 Ibidem, pp. 22-24. 
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protect them. Both cases are hyposthases of the erosion of sovereignty understood as 
exclusivity of jurisdiction and lack of an authority superior to the state. 
The Dissolution of the Political Community
The cohesion of the sovereign state is challenged further on by internal processes, 
such as the porousness of borders and the dissolution of the political community. 
These do not directly affect the two sovereignty marks discussed above, but rather its 
very possibility of existence. Sovereignty is exercised on a clearly delineated territory, 
and in the name of a political body which constitutes the state. 
The sovereign state forges its identity by clearly demarcating two of its most 
important identity markers: territory and political community. Both are crucial for 
circumscribing sovereignty. Territory has been historically constituted by a sharp 
distinction between a domestic space, ordered, hierarchical, where the state exercises 
its sovereignty, and which is delineated by physical borders, and an international 
space which is presented as anarchic and dangerous. Political community, on the other 
hand, is constituted by the demarcation of symbolic borders marking ”otherness”: the 
cohesiveness of the nation is guaranteed by the shared language, culture, traditions 
and, eventually, ethnicity. 
In order to enhance control and sovereignty, a whole range of symbolic narratives 
have been initiated by the state. The physical demarcation of borders is accompanied 
by a discourse of delineation of the domestic space with respect to the external 
realm. Thus, sovereignty is associated with ”a rational identity; a homogeneous and 
continuous presence that is hierarchically ordered, that has a unique centre of decision 
presiding over a coherent ’self’, and that is demarcated from, and in opposition to, an 
external domain of difference and change...”, while the international anarchical space 
is ”an aleatory domain characterized by difference and discontinuity, contingency 
and ambiguity, that can be known only for its lack of the coherent truth and meaning 
expressed by a sovereign presence”1. The state presents itself as the sole authority 
capable of safeguarding this separation between a safe domestic space and a dangerous 
foreign environment, and it can only do this by maintaining very precise separation 
lines between inside and outside. Not only the outside is dangerous, but all that comes 
from outside the boundaries of the state has the potential of becoming so: hence, the 
foreigners have always been regarded with distrust by nation states. 
Territory and political community are intimately linked. The ideal of super-
position between a political community conceived in terms of nationality and a 
clearly demarcated territory has been a constant of modern European politics. This 
has become an ontological link in the European mentalities: there is an ontological 
necessity of correspondence between the territory (topos) and the nation, that Jacques 
Derrida called ”ontopology”2. And the fact that globalization weakens, on the one 
hand, the superposition between territory and nation, and on the other hand the 
borders between communities and between states, generates a counter-reaction of 
protection from the state and the political community which consists in re-inscribing 
1 Richard ASHLEY, ”Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
Problematique”, Millennium. Journal of International Studies, vol. 17, 1988, pp. 227-262/p. 230. 
2 Jacques DERRIDA, Spectres de Marx, Galilée, Paris, 1993. 
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borders and re-asserting cultural and national differences, in order to hold on to their 
ontological identity. 
How are borders affected by the advent of globalization? First, the phenomena 
that accompany globalization have virtualized much of the traditionally physical 
exchanges – such as money transfers, communication, and even commerce. Physical 
borders have become irrelevant for this kind of exchanges. Moreover, the existence 
of the world wide web allows for the creation of virtual communities which are not 
territorially coherent. Before globalization, the very idea of community was linked to a 
contiguous space; this is one of the reasons for the success of the political communities 
based on the idea of nation in the 19th century. The internet made possible for people 
to federate around shared ideas, interests or principles without being conditioned 
by proximity and in a transnational manner. This de-territorialization, this lack of 
boundaries is a great blow for traditional political communities and a direct threat to 
the cohesiveness of the nation-state. The latter sees itself obliged to find new ways of 
reconstituting the borders of its political body. 
Any political community needs a binding principle, an idea capable of holding it 
together. In Europe, since the 19th century, this role has been accomplished by the idea 
of nation. Being understood, in the German tradition, as community of race, culture 
and language, and in the French tradition as the will of living together (in the words 
of Ernest Renan, the nation is a ”daily plebiscite”1), the nation has been the privileged 
form of political community, the depository of state’s sovereignty. However, Renan’s 
voluntary definition of the nation is somehow idealistic, since neither will, nor culture 
seem to be enough for holding together a nation2. Something else is necessary: a 
centralized political apparatus and an educational system that promotes the official 
culture that is subsequently embraced by all the members of the nation. ”People wish 
to unite politically with (and only with) those who share their culture.”3 Moreover, the 
nation is a primary referent of identity for those who are part of it: in the 20th century, 
people define themselves first as French, Romanian, German or Italian, and only 
secondly with other identity marks such as European, liberal, environmentalist etc. A 
nation can be thought of in terms of ”a politically autonomous identity community” 
– where an identity community is defined as ”an autonomous human group whose 
members consider, explicitly or implicitly, that they belong above all to the respective 
community”4. Or, globalization not only obliterates borders, but it also transforms 
political communities. The nation is no longer the privileged referent of identity. ”Mourir 
pour la patrie” has a totally different meaning and appeal today than it had a century 
ago. Loyalties shifted from the nation-state to other forms of communities, hence the 
growing importance of regions and local communities. Moreover, the possibility of 
instant communication through the Internet has allowed for the existence of virtual 
communities: thus, the idea of community is no longer territorially-dependent. One 
can declare oneself an anti-statalist, a Marxist, a Basque, a Berliner or a human rights 
activist before he/she is French, Dutch, Spanish or German. Thus, globalization has 
1 Ernest RENAN, ”Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?”, conférence faite à la Sorbonne, le 11 mars 
1882.
2 Ernest GELLNER, Naţiuni şi naţionalism, Romanian transl. by Robert Adam, Antet, 
Bucureşti, 1997, pp. 85-87. 
3 Ibidem, p. 87. 
4 Sergiu MIŞCOIU, Formarea naţiunii. O teorie socio-constructivistă, Efes, Cluj-Napoca, 2006, 
p. 41. 
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eroded not only frontiers, but also the identity foundation of the nation-state and has 
weakened the bonds that held together the national political communities. Or, the 
nation has been such a successful story for the 19th and 20th century states, that they 
continue to hold on to it with all the means available – including criminalizing the 
immigrant as the ”illegal alien”, a portrait intended to create an image of the stranger 
as a threat to the political community. 
Even if we choose not to appeal to the concept of ”nation” in order to understand 
the bonds of the sovereign state’s political community, we nevertheless find that the 
state is an exclusionary form of political organization1. The sovereign state generates 
exclusion, by posing a rigid distinction between ”us” and ”them”. In other words, 
it needs ‘otherness’ in order to constitute its own identity. Difference with respect to 
the stranger, as well as borders that demarcate the domestic political space, create 
identity.
Andrew Linklater has developed a strong argument about the ”sovereignty-
territory-nationality-citizenship nexus”2. He argues that the modern state has put 
in practice a totalizing project that is based on the assumption that the boundaries 
of sovereignty, territory, nationality and citizenship must coincide3. This is why 
boundaries have to be clearly demarcated both in what concerns territory and the 
political community – the nation. The result of this project is the creation of an 
exclusionary form of community, that Linklater calls ”bounded community”, which 
is based on the principle of difference and separation with respect to the rest of the 
world. Researches of the critical theorists and postmodern thinkers of International 
Relations lead to the same conclusion about the constitution of the modern state 
around the notions of territory and political community: 
”Identity […] is an effect forged, on the one hand, by disciplinary practices 
which attempt to normalize a population, giving it a sense of unity, and on the 
other, by exclusionary practices which attempt to secure the domestic identity 
through processes of spatial differentiation, and various diplomatic, military, 
and defence practices”4.
The sense of unity of the political body of the nation-state is also consolidated 
through collective violence, as shown by René Girard. Persecution is a primordial 
mechanism of the constitution of a community. The latter is bond by the foundational 
sacrifice which has to be renewed periodically, as a form of remembrance of its identity. 
Moreover, crisis moments favor collective persecutions. Marginals and outsiders 
constitute the perfect victims for these secularized rituals:
”Ethnic and religious minorities tend to polarize majorities against them. 
We can identify here a victim-selection criterion which is, of course, specific to 
1 Richard DEVETAK, ”Critical Theory”, in Scott BURCHILL et al., Theories of International 
Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2001, pp. 155-180. 
2 Andrew LINKLATER, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the 
Post-Westphalian Era, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
3 Ibidem, p. 29. 
4 Richard DEVETAK, ”Postmodernism”, in Scott BURCHILL et al., Theories...cit., pp. 181-
208/pp. 194-195. 
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each society, but which is also trans-cultural in its principle. There are no societies 
which don’t subject their minorities, the less integrated groups or simply those 
who are different, to certain forms of discrimination, if not persecution […] The 
victim selection has universal characteristics...”1.
Without reference to Girard, but arguing the same type of marginality of the 
stranger, Nedim Karakayali provides empirical proof to show that in modern 
societies, the strangers fulfill social roles that none of the natives are willing or able 
to perform2. 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks also constituted the occasion of the radicalization of the 
discourse that criminalized the stranger. The stranger is a suspect by the very fact that 
he/she does not belong, that he/she is different. Its position in the western societies 
became more and more unstable. In all Western states, the immigration policies 
hardened. Actually, the 9/11 attacks marked the beginning of a wave of policies that 
restricted individual freedoms, instituted controls and surveillance of the state over 
the private lives of the citizens, marginalized even more the non-natives and, last but 
not least, re-instituted strong borders in the forms of stricter controls at the frontiers, 
but also as physical walls and fences. 
The Security Discourse
 State discourses on security dramatically evolved since the Cold War period. Barry 
Buzan deplored, in the first edition of his very famous book, the fact that the concept 
of ”security” was only used in its military dimension3. The situation is completely 
different nowadays and he wouldn’t have anything to complain about anymore. 
Because the concept of ”security” penetrated the whole range of human activities. We 
now hear about environmental security, food security, markets security, social secu rity, 
human security, cyber-security. But the unstoppable inflation of ”security” discourses 
might prove just as unproductive, if not as dangerous, as neglecting the concept. 
It is the work of Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School that first pointed to 
the widening of the meaning given to the term. Together with Ole Waever and other 
theorists, he produced a categorization of security into five different fields: military, 
political, economic, environmental, and societal4. These authors observed that the 
new European security agenda of the end of the 20th century focused on other types 
of security threats than the traditional, Cold War security agenda, which was mainly 
preoccupied by military aspects. After the Cold War, security can be re-conceptualized 
on two dimensions: ”state security” – in the traditional sense, and ”societal security”, 
which is focused on identity as the basic value of a society. Identity, the authors 
1 René GIRARD, Ţapul ispăşitor, Romanian transl. by Theodor Rogin, Nemira, , Bucureşti, 
2000, p. 26.
2 Nedim KARAKAYALI, ”The Uses of the Stranger: Circulation, Arbitration, Secrecy, and 
Dirt”, Sociological Theory, vol. 24, no. 4, Dec. 2006, pp. 312-330. 
3 Barry BUZAN, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post Cold War Era, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, 1983. 
4 Barry BUZAN, Ole WAEVER, Morten KELSTRUP, Pierre LEMAITRE, Identity, Migration 
and the New Security Agenda in Europe, Pinter Center for Peace and Conflict Research, London, 
1993. 
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contend, is at least as important as physical preservation; this is why a threatened 
identity is at least as significant as a military security threat. But threats to identity 
are not as visible as military threats; they come into being only by being stated by a 
political actor. This is actually the key of the vision of the Copenhagen School, offered 
by Ole Waever1. Security threats are performed through speech acts; they only exist 
if they are perceived as such; and they come to be perceived by a society if there is a 
political actor which emphasizes them. Thus, security issues are those issues that are 
”staged as existential threats to referent objects by a securitizing actor who thereby 
generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise 
bind”2. This is the core of Waever’s famous theory of ”securitization”. The influence of 
Carl Schmitt on Waever’s work is visible in this statement, as this definition explains 
the way in which security threats can be used in order to invoke a state of exception 
that asserts sovereignty beyond the legal norms of a society3. This is one of the ways 
in which state sovereignty, more and more threatened by the 21st century evolutions 
of the international environment, tries to survive the new globalized, transnational 
and de-territorialized realities of our world. 
The discourse about security constructs state identities in a world so fluid that 
states need to incessantly reassess themselves. The idea that states maintain their very 
existence through security discourses has been further examined by IR scholars. One 
of the most famous contributions belongs to David Campbell, according to whom 
”The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a 
state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility”4, but there are also other 
contributions to the topic5. 
The end of the 1990s brought another evolution of the concept of ”security”. After 
it had been transposed into economic, political, environmental and, most thoroughly 
developed, societal terms, the word was given a new dimension in the expression 
human security. The term has been launched by the United Nations Development 
Program in the Human Development Report of 1994, but it is extremely vague in its 
content: 
”Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, 
safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, 
it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily 
life – whether in homes, in jobs or communities”6.
1 Ole WAEVER, ”Securitization and Desecuritization”, in R.D. LIPSCHULTZ (ed.), On 
Security, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995. 
2 Barry BUZAN, Ole WAEVER, Jaap DE WILDE, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, 
Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London, 1998, p. 5.
3 The sovereignty is defined by Schmitt as the capacity to institute the exception from the 
legal order. See Carl SCHMITT, Political Theology, transl. from German by George Schwab, The 
MIT Press, Cambridge and London, 1985, p. 5. 
4 David CAMPBELL, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 
University of Minnesotta Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1998, p. 12. 
5 Michael STERN, Naming Insecurity – Constructing Identity, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2005. 
6 UNDP Human Development Report, ”New Dimensions of Human Security”, 1994, 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/ (accessed: 30 August 2011).
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As such, it was completely inoperable. However, we should notice that the 
accent is not on the state anymore, but on the human being. The shift of the emphasis 
from the state to the human being (more precisely, to the life of the human being) 
allows for the inclusion, into the concept of human security, of situations that occur 
inside states – such as genocides committed by the state itself against its own people. 
The multiplication of infra-state conflicts and events that lead to waves of refugees, 
migration and political instability certainly contributed to this shift, as well as to 
the consecration, in international politics, of another controversial notion: that of 
”humanitarian intervention”. 
Thus, since its resurrection (thanks to the work of Barry Buzan), the notion of 
”security” shifted to ”societal security” and ”human security”. Then, the emphasis 
moved to the other term of the expression: the human dimension. The need to protect 
– or to assure the security of populations – was a preferred topic in the international 
political discourse of the 1990s and 2000s. Actually, ”human security” is a notion 
that evolves in a close relation to those of ”humanitarian protection”, ”humanitarian 
assistance” and ”humanitarian intervention” – a term that has been used for the first 
time to characterize the UN intervention for the protection of the Kurdish population 
in Northern Iraq, in 19911. However, the idea of humanitarian intervention could 
not gain much terrain: while its supporters insisted on the word ”humanitarian”, its 
contenders emphasized the word ”intervention”. And the end of the 1990s brought 
about several too bold speeches of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, about the 
need for humanitarian intervention2. After this moment, this type of discourse begins 
to fade, in favor of the emergence of a new concept: responsibility to protect. 
In parallel with the emergence of the notion of responsibility to protect, another 
evolution can be grasped in international politics after the September 11 attacks, 
namely, the return of the emphasis on national security or ”homeland security”. The 
war against terrorism brought about a whole series of measures intended to increase 
security, such as the Patriot Act or the law of the Military Commissions in the USA3, 
but also the 2008 security package in Italy4. In order to be safe, the governments 
argued, citizens must accept to give up some of their liberties – such as, for example, 
the secrecy of correspondence or of medical files. Moreover, governments are more 
and more preoccupied by threats from within, such as immigration or terrorism. 
These are two of the most quoted ”new types of threats” indexed in the national 
security strategies of the Western countries. But the difference with respect to the Cold 
War national security discourse are obvious: the threats are not exterior to the state 
anymore. They come from within; the anarchic foreign environment has infiltrated 
itself inside the states, threatening its coherence, its cohesion, and its existence. 
1 Hamit BOZARSLAN, ”De la géopolitique à l’humanitaire. Le cas du Kurdistan d’Irak”, 
Cultures et conflits, no. 11, 1993, pp. 41-64. The French language offers a more subtle distinction 
between intervention and ingérence. 
2 For a discussion around these initiatives Thomas G. WEISS, ”The Politics of 
Humanitarian Ideas”, Security Dialogue, vol. 31, no. 1, 2000, pp. 11-23. 
3 Ruth WEDGWOOD, ”Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions”, American Journal 
of International Law, vol. 96, no. 2, April 2002, pp. 328-337. 
4 Massimo MERLINO, ”The Italian (In)Security Package. Security vs. Rule of Law and 
Fundamental Rights in the EU”, Challenge Research Paper no. 14, 2009, available at http://www.
libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_italian_insecurity.pdf (accessed: 10 September 2011).
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The evolution of the content of the notion of ”security” is a hypostasis of the 
transformation of the nature of sovereignty. The discourse about ”security” reflects two 
opposed, but complementary transformations of this notion: the erosion of sovereignty, 
on the one hand, and the consolidation of the internal mechanisms of control, as an 
attempt of the state to re-constitute what has been lost in the first sequence of this 
process, on the other hand. A false opposition has been constructed through political 
discourse between security and liberty. This is a mark of a technique of power that 
is based on a widening control of the state over the lives of the individuals. The state 
is trying to re-constitute its political body and hence its sovereign power through the 
manipulation of the security discourses. 
More and more often, especially after September 11, we hear politicians speaking 
of the ”balance” between liberty and security. Because of the ”new types of threats”, 
mostly the threats from within, the governments justify the institution of exceptional 
measures that suspend the normal legal order. IR scholars from the critical and 
postmodern schools already inquired this tendency1. The Challenge project tries to 
deconstruct the apparent naturalness of the dichotomy liberty-security, suggesting 
that we don’t actually have to make a choice between being surveyed and being 
threatened. On the contrary: the language of balancing ”justifies discriminations, 
legal transgressions and violence of security policies by implying that the exceptional 
and the violent can always be reconciled with the acceptable...”2. In the same line of 
arguments, the Challenge project shows the way in which, based on the exceptional 
security policies designed to prevent illegal migration and terrorism in the EU, the 
distinction between police and military is more and more diluted, mainly because 
of the increasing ambiguity of the distinction between internal and external. Or, 
it is precisely this distinction that constitutes the State: ”The opposition between 
sovereignty and anarchy rests on the possibility of clearly dividing a domesticated 
political space from an undomesticated outside”3. When the distinction is not clear 
anymore, the very identity of the State as a political subject is threatened. 
The subject of human security, as well as of the responsibility to protect, is 
ambiguous: is it the individual? The citizen? The communities? The society? The 
people? Or the ”population”? Scientific literature on the subject does not tackle this 
issue, and the documents of the UN which make reference to the notion are even more 
cautious in designating the subject. But an overall look on this semantic evolution 
points to the fact that the emphasis is not at all on the individual, nor on the citizen, 
nor on the society or the people, but on ”population”. And, while the former have an 
obvious political dimension, the latter is deprived of its political characteristics, being 
taken into account only in its biological dimension. 
If we think that, in the end, security is about the preservation of life – both 
in what concerns internal measures of fight against terrorism, or international 
measures of protecting populations, we are touching another significant aspect of the 
transformation of the State in the globalized era. Commenting on the closing of La 
volonté de savoir de Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben inteprets it as follows: 
1 Challenge Liberty and Security, 2009, http://www.libertysecurity.org/module (accessed: 
30 november 2010). 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Richard DEVETAK, ”Postmodernism”, cit., p. 193. 
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”Foucault summarizes the process by which, at the threshold of the modern 
era, natural life begins to be included in the mechanisms and calculations of 
the State power, and politics turn to biopolitics […] According to Foucault, a 
society’s ’threshold of biological modernity’ is situated at the point at which the 
species and the individual, as a simple living body, become the stake of political 
strategies...”1. 
The turning point of modernity is, thus, the politicization of the bare life. 
This brings us back to the discussion of the bio-power and biopolitics. The over-
preoccupation for the preservation of life, to the detriment of other human rights, 
does not reinforce our democratic values; on the contrary, as Agamben notes:
”Our politics doesn’t know, today, of other value (and, implicitly, of other 
negative value) than life, and as long as the contradictions involved by this fact 
will not be annulled, Nazism and Fascism, which made of the decision on bare 
life the ultimate political criterion, will unfortunately remain actual”2.
The focus on the biological aspects of human life – famines, natural calamities, 
diseases leads to a situation in which ”the space of bare life extends to coincidence 
with the political space”3, taking over all that used to be ”political” in international 
politics. The man is neither a citizen, nor a legal entity, holder of rights and obligations 
anymore; he is rather a statistical element, a living individual in a population, a subject 
of governance – a governance that is instituted for his protection, but not necessarily 
in his name. 
”The inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original – if 
concealed – nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a 
biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.”4
Thus, the doctrine of the R2P institutes some kind of an international ”super-
sovereignty”, since, according to the Report of the Secretary General5, the international 
community can decide the exception from the norm of sovereignty. Moreover, through 
the responsibility to protect, the paradigm of governmentality discussed by Foucault6 
penetrates the international; because in the end, the rationale of the responsibility to 
protect lies in the danger of spillover of the negative phenomena brought about by 
civil wars, genocides or waves of refugees.
Through the security discourse, the states attempt at reconstituting the borders 
inside: now, the immigrants are inside, the terrorists are potentially inside – and thus, 
the frontier between us and them is, itself, inside the state. This is what justifies the 
1 Giorgio AGAMBEN, Homo sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 1998, p. 3.
2 Ibidem, p. 7. See also Hannah ARENDT, The Human Condition, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1998. 
3 Giorgio AGAMBEN, Homo sacer...cit.
4 Ibidem, p. 6. Underlined in original.
5 UN General Assembly A/63/677, cit.
6 Michel FOUCAULT, Securitate...cit.
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institution of surveillance and repressive mechanisms. Not being able to reconstitute 
its territorial borders, not being able to control the flows that are penetrating its 
frontiers, challenged by the emergence of superior international institutions, the state 
takes refuge in the core if its attributions, the one that have been granted to it through 
the social contract: insuring security. The state thus attempts at reconstituting its 
sovereignty by re-constituting its political body (which is more and more becoming 
a mere object of its governance) through the discourse of threat. The common threat 
holds together the political body and ultimately the identity of the state. This is why 
we think that the security discourse is a way of ‘production’ of the society by the 
political power. 
